Abstract. A model of partnership formation based on two traits, called beauty and character, is presented. There are two classes of individual and partners must be of different classes. Individuals prefer prospective partners with a high beauty measure and of a similar character. This problem may be interpreted as e.g. a job search problem in which the classes are employer and employee, or a mate choice problem in which the classes are male and female. Beauty can be observed instantly. However, a costly date (or interview) is required to observe the character of a prospective partner. On observing the beauty of a prospective partner, an individual decides whether he/she wishes to date. During a date, the participants observe each other's character and then decide whether to form a pair. Mutual acceptance is required both for a date to occur and pair formation. On finding a partner, an individual stops searching. Beauty has a continuous distribution on a finite interval, while character 'forms a circle' and has a uniform distribution. Criteria based on the concept of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are used to define a symmetric equilibrium of this game. It is argued that this equilibrium is unique. When dating costs are high, this equilibrium is a block separating equilibrium as in more classical formulations of two-sided job search problems. However, for sufficiently small dating costs the form of this equilibrium is essentially different.
Introduction
This paper presents a model of pair formation based on two traits, called beauty and character. There are two classes of individual, and each individual wishes to form a partnership with someone from the other class. Individuals observe a sequence of potential partners. Mutual acceptance is required for a partnership to form. On finding a partner, an individual ceases searching. One measure describes 'beauty'. Preferences are common according to this measure, i.e. individuals prefer beautiful partners and all individuals of one class agree on how beautiful a member of the other class is. Preferences are homotypic with respect to the second trait, referred to as 'character', i.e. individuals prefer partners of a similar character.
It is assumed that individuals know their own beauty and character. Together the beauty, character and class of an individual define his/her type. The distributions of these traits are continuous on a finite interval. It should be noted that individuals' types are fixed, i.e. they do not age (for a model of mate choice based on age preferences see Alpern et al. [2010] ). Individuals observe the beauty and character of prospective partners perfectly. However, in order to observe character, a costly 'date' is required. In addition, individuals incur search costs.
At each stage of the search process an individual meets a prospective partner. First, both decide whether they wish to date based on the beauty of the prospective partner. After a date, both decide whether to form a pair or not. This decision is based on both traits of the prospective partner. At equilibrium each individual uses a strategy appropriate to their type. The set of strategies corresponding to an equilibrium is called an equilibrium strategy profile.
Such a problem may be interpreted, e.g. as a mate choice problem where the classes are male and female, or as a job search problem with employers and employees. In terms of a job search problem, the search costs of the employers may involve advertising a position, the search costs of an employee may involve looking for an appropriate position and preparing a suitable CV. The dating costs of an employer may involve the costs of setting up an interview and/or accepting an employee on probation. The assumption that beauty can be observed very quickly, but dating is required to observe someone's character, is a simplification. However, in the case of human mate choice many traits that can be thought of as defining beauty (physical beauty, economic status) are usually measured quickly, whilst traits defining character (political and religious views, tastes and emotions) are generally more difficult to measure. Parker (1983) was the first to present a model of two-sided choice in which both sexes prefer mates of high value. At equilibrium, class i males are paired with class i females and there may be one class of either sex who do not mate. McNamara and Collins (1990) consider a similar job search game. Unlike Parker, they explicitly assume that each individual observes a sequence of prospective partners. However, their conclusions are similar.
Further work in the economics literature has developed a 'steady state' approach to such games. Under such models, individuals leave the pool of searchers on finding a partner and are replaced by others, see e.g. Burdett and Coles (1999) , Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith (2006) . The steady state distributions of the values of both classes of searcher depend on the strategies used within the population. From the viewpoint of these papers, the model of McNamara and Collins (1990) assumes that on leaving the pool of searchers a pair of individuals are replaced by clones, i.e. the distributions of the values of both types of searcher are fixed.
On the other hand, there may be a mating (or work) season and as it progresses the distribution of the value of available partners changes. Collins and McNamara (1993) first formulated such a model as a one-sided job search problem with continuous time. Ramsey (2008) considers a similar problem with discrete time. Johnstone (1997) presents numerical results for a discrete time, two-sided mate choice problem. Alpern and Reyniers (2005) and Alpern and Katrantzi (2008) use a more analytic approach and Mazalov and Falko (2008) extend these results.
Alpern and Reyniers (1999) consider a two-sided model in which individuals have homotypic preferences. Mate choice is based on a numeric trait x with the same distribution in both sexes. The cost of mating is the absolute difference between the traits of the partners. The number of prospective mates is finite and the cost of not mating is sufficiently large to ensure that in the last search period an individual prefers mating with the most dissimilar partner to not mating. Iwasa and Pomiankowski (1994) model the evolution of female preferences for multiple sexual ornaments. It is argued that traits can be combined to define a one-dimensional measure of beauty. However, it may be easier to observe some traits than others. Fawcett and Johnstone (2003) consider a model where only females are choosy and can use two signals of male quality. If signals are not very reliable (but not very unreliable), a female should first observe the cheapest signal to evaluate. If it indicates that a male is of high quality, then she should observe the second signal. Sozou (2005) and Seymour and Sozou (2009) consider models of costly dating. Kinsella and Ramsey (2010) present a model of a similar game to the one presented here, in which the distributions of the traits are discrete. They describe the form of a symmetric equilibrium and propose an exhaustive search algorithm, which uses the form of the equilibrium to ensure efficient search. When the distribution of traits is continuous, such an approach is not possible.
In the model presented here, the following assumptions are made:
A: We consider the formation of long term relationships between two classes of player.
When an individual finds a partner, he/she leaves the population of searchers. Henceforth, we refer to the classes as males and females and use the language of mate choice. B: Interactions occur between a male and a female. The length of an interaction is assumed to be small compared to the time between interactions. A pair must decide whether to form a partnership or continue searching. Mutual acceptance is required for partnership formation. Individuals cannot return to a previous prospective partner. C: When an individual leaves the population, he/she is replaced by a clone. Hence, the joint distribution of beauty and character is fixed. It might be more realistic to consider a steady-state approach. However, due to the issues involved in deriving equilibria, for the present the simpler clone replacement approach is adopted. It is intended that the steady state approach will be adopted in future work. D: Time is assumed to be discrete. The search costs per unit time are c 1 , independently of sex. At each moment a player encounters a prospective partner. We assume random matching, i.e. the beauty and character of the female encountered by a male is chosen at random from the joint distribution of these traits among females. One can adapt the model to assume that encounters occur as a Poisson process by assuming that individuals find prospective partners at rate 1 and pay search costs of c 1 per unit time. E: Encounters have two stages. In the first stage, both individuals decide whether they wish to offer a date based on the beauty of the prospective partner. For convenience, it is assumed that these decisions are made simultaneously. Hence, neither individual has any information regarding the character of the other. Dating only occurs by mutual consent and costs c 2 . During a date, each observes the character of the other and then decides whether to accept the other as a partner. Again, it is assumed that these choices are simultaneous. A partnership is formed only by mutual consent. The reward an individual obtains from partnership formation is increasing in the beauty of the partner and decreasing in the difference between characters. The total reward of an individual is the reward gained from the partnership minus the costs of searching and dating.
This approach implicitly assumes that the number of males equals the number of females. However, the model can be adapted to allow the number of males and females to differ. Suppose there are R times as many males as females. In this case, we may assume that at each stage a proportion (R − 1)/R of males meet a prospective partner who would give them a reward of −∞. In reality, such males do not meet a prospective partner at that moment.
Section 2 compares this approach with classical models. This section aims to give an intuitive feel for the approach to solving such problems and the added complexity involved when preferences are mixed. Section 3 describes a model of partnership formation in which character forms a circle. Section 4 gives the set of criteria that we wish an equilibrium to satisfy. These conditions are based on the concept of a subgame perfect equilibrium (a refinement of the concept of Nash equilibrium). Section 5 describes the calculation of the expected rewards of each individual under a given strategy profile. Section 6 considers the dating subgame (when individuals decide whether to form a partnership) and the offer subgame (when individuals decide whether to offer a date). Section 7 presents some results on the form of an equilibrium in the game considered. It is shown that assortative mating occurs with each individual forming a partnership with another of similar beauty and character. Some examples are considered in Section 8. This illustrates the relationship between search and dating costs and the degree of association of the traits. Section 9 outlines some problems associated with generalising the model considered here. Section 10 gives a brief conclusion and suggests directions for further research.
Comparison with the Classical Two-Sided Mate Choice Problem
In classical one-sided mate choice problems, the optimal strategy is a threshold strategy where a female accepts a male if his beauty is at least as great as her expected reward from future search (ignoring previous costs). Two-sided problems are game-theoretic and so we look for a Nash equilibrium solution at which no individual can improve their expected reward by changing strategy. There may be multiple Nash equilibria. For example, suppose that there are two levels of beauty: high and low. Assume individuals only accept those of the other level of beauty. This is a Nash equilibrium, since e.g. a male of high beauty cannot gain by accepting a female of high beauty, as she would not accept him. Also, he could not gain by rejecting a female of low beauty, since he would not find a partner. However, one expects that if a male accepts a female of beauty x, then he accepts any female of beauty > x. McNamara and Collins (1990) derive an equilibrium which satisfies the following condition, referred to as the optimality criterion: any individual accepts a prospective partner if and only if the reward gained from such a partnership is greater or equal to the expected reward of the individual from future search. Such an equilibrium is derived inductively by defining classes of male and females of successively decreasing attractiveness. A female of maximum beauty will be acceptable to any male. Hence, such females face a one-sided problem and their equilibrium strategy is of the form: accept the first male of beauty ≥ x 1 . Call such males first class. It follows that first class males are acceptable to any female and their equilibrium strategy is of the form: accept the first female of beauty ≥ y 1 . Call such females first class. It follows that first class males will only pair with first class females. The problem faced by the rest of the population reduces to a problem in which first class individuals are not present. Define x 0 = y 0 = ∞. Arguing iteratively, k classes of males and females can be defined, such that a male of beauty x is of class i if x i ≤ x < x i−1 and a female of beauty y is of class j if y j ≤ y < y j−1 . Males of class i pair with females of class i. There may be a class of males or females who do not form partnerships.
In the problem considered here, females do not agree on the desirability of a male. It would be natural to try and reduce this game to a sequence of one-sided choice problems. However, there are some technical problems associated with such an approach to games within the general framework presented above. For example, suppose beauty and character are independent and both have a uniform distribution on [0, 1] for both sexes. Individuals of beauty 1 and character 0.5 will have a higher expected reward (i.e. be choosier) than individuals of beauty 1 and extreme character, close to 0 or 1 (see Alpern and Reyniers [1999] ). However, an individual of beauty 0.8 and character 0.5 may be less choosy than an individual of beauty 0.8 and extreme character, since the first may not be acceptable to highly attractive individuals of a similar character, while the second may be. Hence, a similar approach to that adopted by Collins and McNamara will not be appropriate. Ramsey (2010) shows that multiple equilibria satisfying an appropriately generalised optimality condition may exist in a similar problem to the one considered here.
Due to this, we will consider a particular formulation such that there is a unique equilibrium satisfying the appropriately generalised optimality criterion (given later). It is assumed that a: beauty and character are independent and their distributions are independent of sex. The distribution of character in both sexes is uniform between −y 1 and y 1 . The density function of beauty is positive only for values between x 0 and x 1 . b: The difference between characters y 2 and y 3 is calculated mod(2y 1 ), i.e. character can be thought of as a circle with characters of absolute value close to y 1 being assumed to be similar. Thus, when y 3 > y 2 , d(y 2 , y 3 ) is calculated according to d(y 2 , y 3 ) = d(y 3 , y 2 ) = min{y 3 − y 2 , 2y 1 + y 2 − y 3 }. These assumptions suggest that the mating prospects of an individual should not depend on his/her character and (in this sense) all character levels can be treated as equivalent. Intuitively, an individual's expected reward from search is non-decreasing in their beauty. Hence, if an individual of beauty x wishes to mate with an individual of beauty ≤ x, then acceptance should be mutual. Thus individuals of maximum beauty face a one-sided search problem. Furthermore, if an individual of beauty x and character y should offer a date to a prospective partner of beauty z, then any individual of beauty x should offer such a prospective partner a date.
In real job search games, the employee first observes the 'beauty' of a job and then may apply for it. This application may be understood as an 'offer of a date'. This offer will involve some cost (preparing an appropriate CV/application form). The employer then decides whether to invite the applicant for interview or not. Hence, such a game is asymmetric and the offer of a date may well be costly (and possibly give information regarding character). Also, in the model presented here, costs are incurred during a date, but not when offering a date. This has implications regarding the form of an equilibrium, since an individual will be indifferent between offering and not offering a date to a prospective partner who does not want such a date. These factors will be considered later. The following section gives a formal description of this model.
Model of a Symmetric Game with Character Forming a Circle
The population is assumed to be large. Beauty and character are denoted by X and Y , respectively. The distribution of these traits is independent of sex. Let X have a continuous distribution with positive density on the interval between x 0 and x 1 . Character has a uniform distribution on the interval between −y 1 and y 1 . The type of an individual is defined by their sex together with a vector (x, y) whose components are beauty and character, respectively. Individuals prefer partners of high beauty, who have a similar character. To be more precise, denote the reward obtained by a type (x m , y m ) male from pairing with a type (x f , y f ) female by u(x f , d), where d = d(y m , y f ) is the difference between the two individuals' characters. It is assumed that u is bounded, strictly increasing with respect to x f and strictly decreasing with respect to d. The reward obtained by the female from such a pairing is u(x m , d).
At each moment n (n = 1, 2, . . .), each unpaired male is presented with a female picked at random. Hence, individuals can observe as many prospective partners as they wish. No individual can return to a previous prospective partner. The search costs incurred at each stage by individuals are c 1 . The costs of dating are c 2 . Thus it is assumed that search costs are independent of sex. A glossary of the notation used in this article is given in Table 1 .
Individuals observe the type of a prospective partner perfectly. Beauty can be observed without cost (i.e. in an instant), while dating is required to observe character. Encounters utility from partner of beauty x with distance between characters d n and n 1 number of prospective partners seen and dated, respectively c 1 and c 2 search costs and dating costs, respectively Γ 'supergame' played by the whole population π strategy profile played by the population in Γ
game played when male of type (x m , y m ) meets female of type (x f , y f ) and the population follow π f 1 and f 2 density function of beauty and absolute character, respectively f joint density function of beauty and absolute character
set of female types that date males of beauty
set of female types that pair with a male of type (x m , 0) after a date
set of female types that eventually pair with a male of type (x m , 0) r(x; π) or r(x) expected net reward from search of individual of type (
value to male of dating subgame played when male of type (x m , 0) dates female of type (x f , y f ) and the population follow π v f (x m , x f , y f ) value to female of the same dating subgame v m (x m , x f ) expected value to male of the dating subgame when male is of beauty x m , female is of beauty x f and the population follow π v f (x m , x f ) expected value to female of the same dating subgame a(x) minimum acceptable beauty to an individual of beauty x b(x) maximum acceptable difference in character to an individual of beauty x when prospective partner is of beauty a(x) between a male and female can be thought of as a two-player game which comprises up to two stages (subgames). In the first, the offer subgame, both decide whether they want to date based on the beauty of the other. When both wish to date, the pair enter the second stage, the dating subgame. Here, each observes the character of the other and then simultaneously decides whether or not to form a partnership. Mutual acceptance is required for a pair to form. In some scenarios, for example when character is not important, it might pay a pair to mate immediate without dating. However, to keep the strategy space as simple as possible, it is assumed that individuals must always date before forming a pair.
An individual's total reward is the reward gained from pair formation minus the total search costs. Hence, the total reward of a type (x m , y m ) male from pairing with a type (x f , y f ) female after searching for n moments and dating n 1 times is
Let π be the strategy profile used in the mate search game, referred to as the supergame Γ. Hence, π describes the strategy used by each member of the population according to their type (assumed to be a pure strategy). In Γ each individual observes a sequence of prospective partners (plays a sequence of two-player games as described above) until a partner is found. The supergame depends on the distributions of beauty and character, the function u and the search and dating costs. As described above, an encounter between a male and female is split into the offer subgame and the dating subgame. These subgames will be considered in Section 6. These two subgames together define the game played when a male of type (x m , y m ) meets a female of type (x f , y f ) and the strategy profile is π. This game is denoted by G(x m , y m , x f , y f ; π).
Equilibrium Conditions
We look for a Nash equilibrium profile π * of Γ which is symmetric with respect to sex and character as follows:
1: If a male of beauty x 2 is willing to date a female of beauty x 3 , then a female of beauty x 2 is willing to date a male of beauty x 3 . 2: If a male of type (x 2 , y 2 ) is willing to pair with a female of type (x 3 , y 3 ) in the dating subgame, then a female of type (x 2 , y 2 ) is willing to pair with a male of type (x 3 , y 3 ). 3: If a male of type (x 2 , y 2 ) is willing to pair with a female of type (x 3 , y 3 ) in the dating subgame, then a male of type (x 2 , y 2 +k) is willing to pair with a female of type (x 3 , y 3 +k) [here addition is mod(2y 1 )]. This Nash equilibrium profile is assumed to satisfy a generalisation of the optimality criterion for the classical two-sided problem. Namely:
Condition 1: In the dating subgame, an individual accepts a prospective partner if and only if the reward from such a pairing is at least as great as the individual's expected reward from future search (ignoring previous costs). Condition 2: An individual only offers a date if his/her expected reward from the resulting dating subgame minus the costs of dating is as least as great as his/her expected reward from future search. Condition 3: The decisions made by an individual do not depend on the moment at which the decision is made. These conditions are made more precise in Sections 5 and 6. The most preferred partner of a type (x, y) individual is of type (x 1 , y), i.e. of maximum beauty and the same character. Condition 1 states that in the dating subgame an individual will accept his/her most preferred partner. Moreover, if in the dating subgame a female accepts a male who gives her a reward of k, then she must accept any male who gives her a reward of ≥ k. Condition 3 requires the Nash equilibrium profile to be stationary. This reflects the following:
a: An individual starting to search at moment i faces the same problem as one starting at moment 1. b: Since the search costs are linear, after searching for i moments and not finding a partner, an individual maximises his/her expected reward from search simply by maximising the expected reward from future search (i.e. by ignoring previously incurred costs). Note that, as in the classical two-sided job search problem of McNamara and Collins (1990) , these conditions rule out non-intuitive Nash equilibria. For example, suppose that both beauty and character are discrete and take one of two possible levels. Beauty can be high or low and character can be left or right. Suppose individuals are only prepared to date those of a different level of beauty and only mate with those of a different character. No individual can do better by accepting any other types of date or prospective partner, thus such a strategy profile defines a Nash equilibrium. However, such a profile would not evolve by natural selection.
Deriving the Expected Payoffs Under a Symmetric Strategy Profile
Given a strategy profile, we can define which pairs of types date and which mate. Assume that the strategy profile used is symmetric with respect to sex and character in the sense described in Section 4. The expected reward of an individual is independent of sex and character. It suffices to define the strategies used by males of character 0. Suppose a male of type (z, 0) meets a female of type (x, y). The difference between characters has a uniform distribution on (0, y 1 ).
Let f 1 and f 2 denote the density functions of beauty and absolute character, respectively. Denote the joint density of these traits by f . By assumption,
Let A 1 (z; π) be the set of types (given by beauty and absolute character) of females that a male of type (z, 0) will date (under the assumption of mutual acceptance) given the strategy profile π. Let A 2 (z; π) be the set of types of females that a male of type (z, 0) would pair with in the dating game (assuming mutual acceptance). Define A(z; π) to be the set of types of females that eventually pair with a male of type (z, 0).
The probability of a male of type (z, 0) finding a partner at any given moment is the integral of the joint density function of the pair of traits over A(z; π), i.e. the set of females who are mutually acceptable to the male. His expected length of search is the reciprocal of this integral. Similarly, the probability that a male of type (z, 0) dates at any given moment is given by the integral of the joint density function of the pair of traits over A 1 (z; π). Considering the costs of searching and dating, the expected value of the total search costs of such a male is given by
The expected reward of a male of type (z, 0) obtained from pairing (conditioned on mutual acceptance) is given by
Hence, the male's expected total reward from search, r(z; π), is given by
When there is no danger of ambiguity, π will be omitted from the notation used above.
The Dating and the Offer Subgames
Note that when the number of possible prospective partners is limited to N , then the equilibrium strategy profile can be determined by recursion. Firstly, if an individual has not mated with any of the first N − 1 prospective partners, then he/she must date and then mate with the final one. Hence, we can determine the expected reward of each individual when only one prospective partner remains (equal for all individuals). Based on this, we can determine the set of prospective partners that each individual should accept in a dating subgame when only one more prospective mate can be seen afterwards. In turn, we can then determine the set of prospective partners that each individual should date in the penultimate offer subgame and so on. Thus there is a unique equilibrium strategy profile satisfying the optimality conditions. Also, it can be shown that if the equilibrium strategy profile used in the N -horizon problem is symmetric according to sex and character, then the equilibrium strategy profile in the (N + 1)-horizon problem is also symmetric (proof omitted). Since the equilibrium strategy when N = 1 is symmetric, it follows by induction that the unique equilibrium is symmetric. However, the description of the strategy profile for a finite horizon problem is complex, since an individual's actions depend not only on his/her type, but also on the number of prospective partners yet to be seen. On the other hand, in the infinite horizon problem, at equilibrium an individual's actions depend only on his/her type. It seems reasonable to assume that there will be a unique equilibrium strategy profile in the infinite horizon problem, given by the limit of the equilibrium strategy profile when the number of remaining prospective partners tends to infinity. Estimating the equilibrium strategy profile in this way would seem to be highly impractical. Hence, we determine the equilibrium strategy profile by considering what conditions must be satisfied in the dating and offer subgames under an equilibrium strategy profile. Using a recursive approach, it is natural to consider the dating subgame before considering the offer subgame.
6.1. The Dating Subgame. Assume that the population follow a symmetric strategy profile π. The male and female both have two possible actions: accept the prospective partner, denoted acc, or reject, denoted rej. We assume that these decisions are simultaneous. Also, we ignore the costs already incurred by both individuals, including the costs of the present date, as they are subtracted from all the payoffs in the matrix, and do not affect the equilibria in this subgame.
Without loss of generality, suppose the male is of type (z, 0) and the female is of type (x, y). The payoff matrix is given by
Assume that if an individual is indifferent between pairing and not pairing, then he/she accepts a prospective partner. From the form of the function u and the distribution of beauty and character this occurs with probability 0. Otherwise, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is for the female to accept if and only if u(z, y) > r(x) and for the male to accept if and only if u(x, y) > r(z). In intuitive terms, an individual accepts a prospective partner if the difference between their characters does not exceed a threshold which depends on (is increasing in) the beauty of the prospective partner. Note that this equilibrium satisfies Condition 1. If a female rejects a male, then the male is indifferent between accepting or rejecting her. Using the above rule, a male will respond optimally whatever the female does. Let v(z, x, y) = [v m (z, x, y), v f (z, x, y)] denote the value of this game, where v m and v f are the values to the male and female, respectively. We now consider the offer game.
6.2. The Offer Subgame. We now solve the offer subgame and hence the game played when a male of type (z, 0) meets a female of type (x, y), G(z, 0, x, y; π). Assume that the population follows a symmetric strategy profile π. Both individuals decide whether they wish to offer a date (denoted of f ) or continue searching (denoted con). These decisions are made simultaneously based on the beauty of the prospective partner. As before, we may ignore the costs that have been previously incurred. The matrix form of this game is given by (2) Female: of f Female: con Male: of f Male: con
is the expected value of the dating subgame given that the male and female are of beauty z and x, respectively. In defining this value, it is assumed that the players are following the appropriate strategy from the strategy profile π.
Assume that when an individual is indifferent between dating and not dating, then he/she offers a date. The appropriate subgame perfect equilibrium of this subgame is as follows: the male should offer a date when v m (z, x) − c 2 ≥ r(z) and the female should offer a date when v f (z, x) − c 2 ≥ r(x). This equilibrium satisfies Condition 2. Note that if e.g. the male does not want to offer a date, then the female is indifferent between offering and not offering a date.
Some Results on the Equilibrium Strategy Profile
The results given in this section are not intended to fully characterise an equilibrium, but to justify the method of solution adopted in Section 8. Proof. This follows from the assumption of subgame perfectness in the subgames defined above. Suppose x 2 > x 3 . At equilibrium, a female who is willing to date a male of beauty x 3 is willing to date a male of beauty x 2 . Similarly, in the dating subgame, a female who is willing to mate with a male of type (x 3 , 0) will be willing mate with a male of type (x 2 , 0). Given the strategies of the females, the problem faced by males reduces to a problem of optimal stopping. A male of type (x 2 , 0) can ensure himself the same expected reward as a male of type (x 3 , 0) by only dating females a type (x 3 , 0) male would date and mating with females a type (x 3 , 0) male would mate with (under the assumption of mutual acceptance).
Corollary to Theorem 7.1 Suppose x ≥ y. If an individual of beauty x accepts a prospective partner of beauty y in the dating game, then acceptance is mutual. Theorem 7.2. At a symmetric equilibrium satisfying Conditions 1-3, individuals of maximum beauty, x 1 , offer dates to prospective partners of beauty above a certain threshold.
Proof. From the above corollary, the expected reward of a male of beauty x 1 from the dating subgame is non-decreasing in the beauty of the female (since character and beauty are independent). Such a male offers a date if the expected reward from dating is at least as great as r(x 1 ). If this is holds for some level of beauty a(x 1 ), then it holds for all levels of beauty > a(x 1 ). It cannot be optimal for males to never date. Hence, a(x 1 ) < x 1 . Theorem 7.3. Suppose that at a symmetric equilibrium a male of beauty x 2 offers a date to a female of beauty x 3 , where x 2 > x 3 . Any male of beauty z, where z ∈ [x 3 , x 2 ], offers a date to a female of beauty x 2 . Such a date is mutually acceptable.
Proof. Let p(x 2 , x 3 ) be the probability that a male of beauty x 2 pairs with a female of beauty x 3 in the dating subgame. For mutual acceptance to occur, it suffices that the most attractive individual accepts the prospective partner. Hence, for
u(x 3 , y)f 2 (y)dy.
u(x 2 , y)f 2 (y)dy.
It follows that if x 2 ≥ x 3 , then w(x 2 , x 3 ) ≤ w(x 3 , x 2 ). Since at equilibrium a male of beauty x 2 offers a date to a female of beauty x 3 , we have
From Theorem 7.1, in the dating subgame a male of type (z, 0) should accept any female of beauty x 3 that a male of type (x 2 , 0) would. Such acceptance is mutual. Hence, the expected reward of a male of beauty z from such a date is bounded below by p(
From Inequality (3) and Theorem 7.1, we obtain
Hence, a male of beauty z should offer a date to a female of beauty x 3 .
The female's expected reward from such a date is p(z, x 3 )w( x 3 ) , the condition for a male of beauty z to offer a date to a female of beauty x 3 and Theorem 7.1 in that order, we obtain
It follows that the female should also offer such a date.
Corollary to Theorem 7.3 At a symmetric equilibrium, if individuals of maximum beauty offer dates to those of minimum beauty, then all individuals date any prospective partner. Theorem 7.4. At a symmetric equilibrium, if a male of beauty x 2 offers a date to a female of beauty x 3 , where x 3 < x 2 , then the male offers a date to any female of beauty z, where z ∈ [x 3 , x 2 ] (note that from Theorem 7.1 the date is mutually acceptable).
Proof. Since a male of beauty x 2 should offer a date to a female of beauty x 3 , Inequality (3) holds. From Theorem 7.1, in the dating subgame if a male of type (x 2 , 0) accepts a female of type (x 3 , y), then he should accept a female of type (z, y) and such acceptance is mutual. Hence, the expected reward of a male of beauty x 2 from dating a female of beauty z is bounded below by p(x 2 , x 3 )w(x 2 , x 3 ) + [1 − p(x 2 , x 3 )]r(x 2 ) − c 2 . This in turn is at least r(x 2 ). It follows that such a male should offer a date to a female of beauty z. Theorem 7.5. At a symmetric equilibrium, if an individual of beauty x 2 does not offer a date to a prospective partner of beauty x 3 , where x 3 < x 2 , then no individual of beauty z, where z > x 2 , will offer a date to a prospective partner of beauty x 3 .
Proof. Since a male of beauty x 2 does not offer a date to a female of beauty
where the second inequality follows from the optimality condition in the dating subgame. Thus
Hence,
Thus a male of beauty z should not offer a date to a female of beauty x 3 .
Corollary to Theorems 7.3-7.5 At a symmetric equilibrium, an encounter between a male of attractiveness x and a female of attractiveness y will result in a date if and only if y satisfies a(x) ≤ y ≤ a −1 (x), where a(x) is the minimum level of beauty inducing the offer of a date from the male and a −1 (x) is the maximum beauty of a female offering a date to such a male. These functions are non-decreasing in x and a(x) ≤ x ≤ a −1 (x). Also, a(x) < a −1 (x), since the probability of dating at any moment must be greater than 0.
This notation is used since a −1 is a generalisation of the inverse function of a. For example, suppose a is an increasing, continuous function. It follows that if x = a(z), i.e. z = a −1 (x), then z is the maximum beauty of a female who offers a date to a male of beauty x. If a(z) = x ⇔ z ∈ S, then a −1 (x) is defined to be the maximum value in the set S.
Remark This corollary states that dates occur between individuals of 'similar' beauty. Note that at equilibrium a searcher of beauty x is indifferent between offering and not offering a date to a prospective partner of beauty > a −1 (x), as such a prospective partner will not offer a date. In a more general form of such a game, the offer of a date may be associated with costs, denoted by c 3 . Suppose that offers of dates are made simultaneously. We should adapt the form of the offer subgame defined by the payoff matrix in (2) by subtracting c 3 from the payoff of the male in row 1 and also from the payoff of the female in column 1. In this case, (con, con) is always a Nash equilibrium. However, when v m (z, x) − c 2 − c 3 > r(z) and v f (z, x) − c 2 − c 3 > r(x), then (of f, of f ) is the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Hence, if we assume that the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is played, then (of f, of f ) will be played when v m (z, x) − c 2 − c 3 > r(z) and v f (z, x) − c 2 − c 3 > r(x), otherwise (con, con) is played. Since mutual agreement is required for dating to occur, the outcome of such a game will be the same as in the original formulation with the costs of offering a date incorporated into the dating costs. The only difference is that when offering a date is costly, an individual will never offer a date when the prospective partner does not wish to date. Now suppose that the male is the first to decide whether to offer a date and if the female receives an offer, then she must decide whether to accept it. Assume that the costs of an offer are only incurred by the male. In this case, we should solve the extensive form of the offer subgame by recursion. The female only makes a decision when she is offered a date. She should accept when v f (z, x) − c 2 ≥ r(x). Given the female does not want to accept an offer, then the male should not offer a date. Given that the female wishes to accept an offer, then the male should offer a date if and only if v m (z, x) − c 2 − c 3 ≥ r(z). Hence, when v m (z, x) − c 2 − c 3 > r(z) and v f (z, x) − c 2 > r(x), the unique equilibrium path is (of f, of f ). Otherwise, the equilibrium path involves the male not offering a date. When c 3 → 0, then the outcome of the game will be the same as in the original formulation. The only difference is that a male will never offer a date when the female does not accept such an offer. Now we derive a set of conditions that a symmetric equilibrium must satisfy. First, we consider the condition for subgame perfectness in the dating subgame. Without loss of generality, consider a male of type (z, 0). Suppose he meets a female of type (a(z), y), i.e. of the minimum acceptable level of beauty. Since a(z) ≤ z, if the male accepts the female in the dating subgame, then acceptance is mutual. The female should be accepted if and only if u(a(z), y) ≥ r(z). We must consider the following two cases:
1: There exists a b(z) such that b(z) < y 1 and u(a(z), b(z)) = r(z). In this case, the male should accept a female in the dating subgame when the reward obtained from such a pairing is greater than his expected total reward from search, i.e. u(x, y) ≥ r(z) = u(a(z), b(z)), i.e. a male of attractiveness z will mate with a female of attractiveness a(z) when her character differs from his by not more than b(z). As the beauty of a prospective partner increases, the maximum acceptable difference in character also increases. 2: u(a(z), y 1 ) ≥ r(z). In this case any female of beauty a(z) gives a male of beauty z a greater reward than his expected total reward from search and so he should accept any female of beauty ≥ a(z) in the dating subgame. In this case, define b(z) = y 1 .
Now consider the condition for subgame perfectness in the offer subgame. A male should offer a date to a female when the expected reward from the date is greater than the expected reward from search. Note that a(z) ≤ z and the expected reward of a male of type (z, 0) from dating a female of beauty x, where x ≤ z, is increasing in x. The following two cases may occur: a: a(z) > x 0 . In this case, the expected reward from dating a female of beauty a(z) must be equal to r(z). It follows that (4)
If there is no solution a(z) of Equation (4) such that x 0 < a(z) ≤ z, then a(z) = x 0 , i.e. a male of beauty z dates any female.
Let A(z) be the set of females a male of type (z, 0) will mate with at equilibrium (under the assumption of mutual acceptance in both subgames). In order to define a symmetric equilibrium, we must specify a(z), r(z) and b(z) for x 0 ≤ z ≤ x 1 . Hence, we need one more condition. This is given by Equation (1) . Note that specifying a(x 1 ) and r(x 1 ) defines the strategy of a male of maximum beauty, since he will offer dates to females of beauty ≥ a(x 1 ) and in the dating subgame mate with females who ensure a reward of at least r(x 1 ). Also, the maximum reward obtained from a pairing is u(x 1 , 0) and an individual must both observe and date at least one prospective partner. Hence, r(x 1 ) < u(
The results given above are valid when u(x, y) is increasing in x and decreasing in y. In the further analysis of this game we make the additional assumption that u is a separable function, i.e. u(x, y) = u 1 (x) − u 2 (y), where both u 1 and u 2 are strictly increasing functions. Theorem 7.6. Suppose the reward function u is separable. The optimal strategy of an individual of beauty x 1 is uniquely defined.
Proof. It will be shown that there is exactly one optimal response corresponding to any pair of positive costs (c 1 , c 2 ).
Case 1: A male of maximum beauty is choosy in both subgames. Firstly, we assume that a(z) > x 0 and b(z) < y 1 . Combining the equilibrium conditions from the two subgames, the expected reward of a type (z, 0) male from search is equal both to u(a(z), b(z)) and to the expected reward from dating a female of beauty a(z). Hence,
Rearranging this equation, it follows from the separability of the function u that
Note that for 0 ≤ y ≤ y 1 , v 1 (s) can be expressed as g 1 (s)q 1 (s), where g 1 (s) is the expected gain in the reward obtained by a male of character 0 from pairing with a female of randomly chosen absolute character ≤ s rather than with a female of character s and q 1 (s) is the probability of a female having an absolute character ≤ s.
and v 1 (s) is a continuous, strictly increasing function for 0 < s < y 1 . It follows that for
there is a unique solution b(z) of Equation (5), where 0 < b(z) < y 1 . Setting z = x 1 and rearranging Equation (1), it follows from Equation (5) that
Since the beauty and character of a female are independent, it follows that
It should be noted that [a(x 1 ),
, since a male of type (x 1 , 0) may mate with a female of character > b(
e. the set of females that a male of beauty x 1 will mate with is split into two disjoint sets, those whose character differs by ≤ b(x 1 ) and those whose character differs by > b(x 1 )]. Rearranging the above equation, it follows from the separability of u that
Note that v 2 (s) can be expressed as
, where q 2 (s) is the proportion of females who have beauty ≥ s and also give a male of type (z, 0) a reward ≥ u(s, b(x 1 )), g 2 (s) is the expected reward of the male from pairing with such a female and k 2 (s) is the expected reward of the male from pairing with a female of beauty s who gives the male a reward ≥ u(s, b(x 1 )). Hence, v 2 (x 1 ) = 0 and v 2 (s) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function for x 0 ≤ w ≤ x 1 . Thus for c 1 < v 2 (x 0 ) there is a unique solution a(x 1 ) of Equation (6), where x 0 < a(x 1 ) < x 1 . Adding c 2 to both sides of this inequality, from Equation (5), the separability of u and the independence of the two traits,
and Condition (8) is satisfied, males of maximum beauty have a unique optimal strategy. Case 2: Males of maximum beauty are not choosy when offering dates, but choosy in certain dating subgames. Now consider the case in which a male of type (z, 0) offers a date to any female, i.e. a(z) = x 0 , but only pairs with a female of minimum beauty if her character is ≤ỹ(z), where 0 <ỹ(z) < y 1 . Since this male offers dates to females of beauty x 0 , it follows that
From the separability of u, we obtain
Since v 1 is strictly increasing,ỹ(z) ≥ b(z), where b(z) is the solution of Equation (5) . From the analysis of Case 1, c 2 < u 2 (y 1 ) − E[u 2 (Y )]. This argument holds for all beauty levels z, such that x 0 ≤ z ≤ x 1 .
Setting z = x 1 and considering the equilibrium condition in the supergame Γ, we obtain
)} is the set of females the male will mate with under such a strategy. Rearranging this equation, we obtain
Note that v 3 (s) can be expressed as q 3 (s)[g 3 (s) − u(x 0 , s)], where q 3 (s) is the proportion of females giving the male a reward ≥ u(x 0 , s) and g 3 (s) is the expected reward of the male from pairing with a such a female. Hence,
Also, v 3 (b(x 1 )) is given by the right hand side of Inequality (8).
Since v 3 (s) is a continuous, strictly increasing function for s between 0 and y 1 ,ỹ(x 1 ) ≥ b(x 1 ) andỹ(x 1 ) is a solution of Equation (9), it follows that (8) is not satisfied, then males of beauty x 1 have a unique optimal strategy under which they date any female but do not pair with all females.
Case 3: Males of beauty x 1 are choosy when offering dates, but not choosy in dating subgames.
Now suppose that a male of beauty z is willing to pair with any female of beauty ≥ a(z), where a(x 1 ) > x 0 . It follows that the expected reward of the male from dating a female of beauty a(z) (minus the dating costs) must be equal to the expected reward from search, but less than or equal to the reward from pairing with a female of type (a(z), y 1 ), i.e.
This holds for all beauty levels between x 0 and x 1 . Setting z = x 1 , from Equation (1), we obtain
Using the separability of u, together with the independence of the two traits, we obtain
Note that v 4 (s) can be expressed as q 4 (s)g 4 (s), where q 4 (s) is the proportion of females with beauty ≥ s and g 4 (s) is the expected gain of a male from pairing with such a female rather than with a female of beauty s. Hence,
, then males of beauty x 1 have a unique optimal strategy under which they are choosy when offering a date, but pair with the first female dated.
Case 4: Males of maximum beauty are not choosy in either subgame. Since a male of beauty x 1 is willing to date and pair with any female, we must have
Using the separability of u, it follows that Also, since the expected reward of such a male from a date with a female of beauty x 0 must be greater than or equal to his expected reward from search, we obtain
Using the separability of u and the independence of character and beauty, it follows that
Hence, when Conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied, it is optimal for individuals of maximum beauty to date and pair with the first prospective partner encountered.
Conclusion. These four cases partition the set {(c 1 , c 2 ) : c 1 , c 2 > 0}. In each case there is a unique solution of the problem faced by an individual of maximum beauty. Fig. 1 illustrates the form of the strategy used by an individual of maximum beauty. Corollary to Theorem 7.6. If Conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied, at the symmetric equilibrium profile all individuals date and pair with their first prospective partner.
In this case, for all z between x 0 and x 1 the value function for the game is given by
There are five possible forms of the set A(x 1 ) that do not correspond to random pairing. A (1) A (1) A (1) A (1) A ( This equilibrium corresponds to Case 3 and is analogous to the equilibrium of the classical two-sided job search problem derived by McNamara and Collins (1990) . The proof is similar.
Proof.
. From the form of a symmetric equilibrium, any two individuals of beauty in D 1 are mutually acceptable to each other in both the offer and the dating subgames and such individuals do not date prospective partners not in D 1 . The problem faced by individuals not in D 1 then reduces to the following supergame:
1: The distribution of beauty and character are assumed to be the same as in the original game. An encounter with a prospective partner of beauty ≤ a(x 1 ) is treated in the same way as in the original game. Prospective partners of beauty > a(x 1 ) are assumed to give a utility of −∞, i.e. searchers will not date them. 2: Search and dating costs are the same as in the original problem. From Theorem 7.6, in this reduced game males of beauty a(x 1 ) pair with any female or date and pair with any female of beauty ≥ a(a(x 1 )) = a 2 (x 1 ) > x 0 . In the first case m = 2 and
In the second case, we can derive the form of the reduced supergame faced by individuals of beauty < a 2 (x 1 ). The remaining D i can be found by iteratively defining further reduced versions of the original supergame. Let Γ i denote the i-th reduced supergame defined in this way, i = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1. Males involved in Γ i are of beauty ≤ a i (x 1 ). Suppose a male of beauty a i (x 1 ) should be choosy in Γ i . From the equilibrium conditions,
It follows that the proportion of males in class
Hence, m is bounded above by q , where x is the smallest integer not exceeded by x.
Such an equilibrium is considered in Example 2. Suppose a male of type (z, 0) meets a female of type (x, y) (where y > 0). The pair will date if a(z) ≤ x ≤ a −1 (z). In the dating subgame, when x ≤ z, acceptance is mutual if u(x, y) ≥ r(z). When x > z, acceptance is mutual if u(z, y) ≥ r(x). It follows that A(z) = A 3 (z) ∪ A 4 (z), where A 3 (z) and A 4 (z) are the following disjoint sets:
Although A(z) can always be described in this way, we must take account of the form of A(z) when solving the game. This form depends on the following three conditions: C1: Do males of beauty x 1 date females of beauty z? i.e. is a(x 1 ) ≤ z? C2: Do males of beauty z date females of beauty x 0 ? i.e. is a(z) > x 0 ? C3: Do males of beauty z pair only with some females of the same beauty? i.e. is u(z, y 1 ) < r(z)? The possible forms of A(z) are illustrated in Fig. 3 . It should be noted that if u(z, y 1 ) > r(z), we should find a 1 (z) and a 2 (z), such that a(z) ≤ a 1 (z) ≤ z ≤ a 2 (z) ≤ a −1 (z) and males of beauty z pair with all females of beauty in [a 1 (z), a 2 (z)], but not with all females of beauty x / ∈ [a 1 (z), a 2 (z)]. Note that the maximal mutually acceptable difference in character occurs when two prospective partners have the same beauty.
In Cases 2 and 5, a female of beauty x 1 pairs with any male of beauty ≥ a 1 (x 1 ). Thus males of beauty ≥ a 1 (x 1 ) face a one-sided search problem. Hence, r(z) = r(x 1 ) and A(z) = A(x 1 ) for z ≥ a 1 (x 1 ). Consider a male of beauty just below a 1 (x 1 ). From the form of the optimal policy of those of higher beauty, he would be unacceptable to a highly attractive female only when the difference between their characters is large. It thus seems reasonable to assume that the value function r is continuous in some interval (x, a 1 (x 1 )). Arguing similarly, in Cases 1 and 4, a male of beauty just below x 1 will have only marginally worse opportunities for pairing than a male of beauty x 1 . Hence, it seems reasonable that in Cases 1, 2, 4 and 5 the value function satisfies a differential equation with the boundary condition given by the value of r(a 1 (x 1 )) in Cases 2 and 5 and by the value of r(x 1 ) in Cases 1 and 4. This differential equation may be obtained by appropriately rearranging Equation (1) and differentiating with respect to z. The derivation of this equation and its numerical solution are illustrated by Example 1 in the following section. 
Examples
Suppose beauty and character are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and [−1, 1], respectively, i.e. f 1 (x) = f 2 (x) = 1, when x ∈ [0, 1], otherwise f 1 (x) = f 2 (x) = 0. Search and dating costs are are equal to c 1 and c 2 , respectively. The reward from pairing is assumed to be the beauty of the partner minus the difference between the characters of the pair, d(y 1 , y 2 ), where d(y 1 , y 2 ) = min{|y 1 − y 2 |, 2 − |y 1 − y 2 |}. Hence, u(x, y) = x − y, thus u is separable, u 1 (x) = x, u 2 (y) = y.
From Theorem 7.6, a male may be choosy in the dating subgame only when c 2 < 0.5. Assume c 2 < 0.5. Suppose that a(z) > 0 and b(z) < 1, i.e. a male of beauty z is choosy when offering dates and in dates with females of beauty a(z). It follows that Equation (5) holds and
This equation holds as long as a(z) ≥ 0, i.e. r(z) ≥ − √ 2c 2 . From the form of u, if r(1) > 0, then males of beauty 1 do not pair with all females of beauty 1. If − √ 2c 2 < r(1) < 0, then males of beauty 1 pair with any female above some beauty (to be specified). The probability of an individual of beauty z mating at any given moment is |A(z)|, where |A(z)| denotes the area of the set A(z). Rearranging Equation (1), we obtain
Differentiating this equation with respect to z and rearranging, we obtain
Solving this equation numerically, Condition C3 is satisfied for all z ∈ [0, z 1 ] and r(0) ≈ −0.5958. For medium levels of beauty (between 0.4175 and 0.4728), r(z) increases rapidly in z. Since the minimum acceptable beauty, a(z), increases slowly in z for z > 0.4728, a −1 (z) is rapidly increasing in z for z just below 0.4728.
For low levels of beauty (below 0.4175), r(z) is only slowly increasing in z. Individuals of beauty 0.4175 will date individuals of beauty 0 and are not dated by individuals of beauty above 0.5496. Hence, individuals in this class almost exclusively date other members of the class. Fig. 5 illustrates the set of mutually acceptable partners for individuals of beauty levels 1 (maximum), 0.5 (lower end of the highly attractive class), 0.45 (medium level of beauty), 0.4 (upper end of the lowly attractive class).
Numerical results indicate that decreasing the search costs increases the number of these 'pseudo-classes' and the correlation between the trait values of partners. These classes are more fuzzy for lower levels of beauty than high levels. 8.2. Example 2. Assume c 1 = 0.1 and c 2 = 0.6. From Theorem 7.6, at the unique symmetric equilibrium individuals are partitioned into classes according to beauty. We have Hence, 
Generalisation of the Model
Suppose that character is placed along a line instead of around a circle, i.e. the difference between characters is the standard absolute difference. In the problems analogous to those presented in Section 8, there is still a large degree of symmetry with respect to sex and character (e.g. individuals of types (x, y) and (x, −y) can be assumed to have the same expected return from search). However, the value function has both beauty and character as arguments.
We wish to derive an equilibrium which reflects this inherent symmetry. Suppose a type [x 2 , y 2 ] male is willing to date a female of beauty x 3 and pairs with a female of type [x 3 , y 3 ]. Firstly, a type [x 2 , y 2 ] female should be willing to date a male of beauty x 3 and pair with a male of type [x 3 , y 3 ]. Secondly, a type [x 2 , −y 2 ] male should be willing to date a female of beauty x 3 and pair with a female of type [x 3 , −y 3 ]. Assume that the distribution of character is symmetric about zero and f 2 (y) is non-increasing for y ≥ 0. It is expected that males of type [x 1 , 0] have the highest expected reward from search (see Alpern and Reyniers [1999] ) and thus such individuals face a one-sided search problem. However, suppose an individual of high beauty and extreme character accepts a prospective partner of lower beauty and central character. In this generalised problem, it is not clear that acceptance will be mutual.
Hence, such a generalised problem seems very difficult to solve. One possible approach might be to use policy iteration. Starting with an initial strategy profile π 0 , one calculates the set of optimal responses of individuals according to type. Call this optimal response profile π 1 . In the same way π i+1 is defined as the best response profile to the strategy profile π i . If such an iterative procedure converges, it converges to an equilibrium strategy profile. Ramsey (2010) uses such an approach to a problem in which beauty and character come from discrete distributions.
Conclusion
This paper presents a model of partnership formation where multiple traits are observed. We consider a particular type of such problems in which the distributions of the traits, as well as search and dating costs, are independent of the class (sex) of a player. A numerical procedure to estimate a symmetric equilibrium is described. It is argued that this equilibrium is unique.
The equilibrium criteria are a generalisation of the optimality criterion used by McNamara and Collins (1990) for the classical two-sided job search problem. At the equilibrium of their game, the population are divided into classes according to beauty. In the game presented here, if the costs of dating (i.e. of observing character) are high, then there is such an equilibrium. For lower dating costs, the form of the symmetric equilibrium is more complex, but still intuitive. Individuals date prospective partners of similar beauty and pair with a prospective partner if the reward gained from such a partnership is at least as great as the expected reward from future search. This leads to assortative matching, i.e. each individual pairs with another of similar beauty and character. The lower the search costs, the higher the degree of association between the traits of partners.
The use of this combination of preferences would seem to be logical in relation to mate choice. Although there is no perfect correlation in individuals' assessment of the beauty of members of the other sex, there is normally a very high level of agreement. Using such an approach, individuals have their own personal ranking of members of the other class. This approach seems to be a good compromise between the approach used in the classical matching problem (see Gale and Shapley [1962] ) and the assumption of common preferences made in classical job search and mate choice problems. These 'mixed' preferences seem to be reasonably tractable within the framework of searching for a partner within a large population and allow a general enough framework to model the preferences of individuals reasonably well (although modelling character as a one-dimensional variable seems rather simplistic).
For simplicity, it was assumed that individuals know their own beauty and character, whereas in practice they may have to learn about these measures (see Fawcett and Bleay [2009] ). Also, it is assumed that individuals are able to measure beauty and character perfectly, although at some cost. It would be interesting to consider different ways of gaining information during the search process. For example, some information about the character of a prospective partner may be readily available. Hence, an improved model would allow some information to be gained on both the beauty and character of a prospective partner at each stage of an interaction. As described in the previous section, it would also be useful to adapt the algorithm to problems in which character levels do not form a circle. Finally, it would be interesting to consider games in which the distribution of traits and/or search costs depended on sex.
